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The same laws cannot suit so many diverse provinces with dif-
ferent customs, situated in the most various climates, and inca-
pable of enduring a uniform government. 
Rousseau, The Social Contract 
Conventional wisdom was that lddians should drive on the 
right side of the road. During ldd's first hundred years, most 
Iddians believed this was one of the ten divine Traffic Command-
ments. For the most part, traffic seemed to flow smoothly too. 
Those who violated the rules usually did so negligently, not in-
tentionally, and they were dealt with harshly. To be sure, there 
were doctrinal differences among lddian sects about, for exam-
ple, how far right of the striping on traffic lanes vehicles should 
travel, but these disagreements were minor. 
That was all to change in the Nineteenth Century when im-
migrants began arriving from neighboring civil law countries. 
Immigrants argued that driving on the left side of the road is di-
vine, a belief lddians thought heresy. lddians initially responded 
to this doctrine by hanging its most visible proponents. But over 
time, some Iddians, who became known as "liberals," were per-
suaded that the immigrants' faith was more accurate or at least 
not inconsistent with historic lddian theology. Immigrants and 
liberal Iddians formed sects that drove on the left side of the 
road only at night in secluded areas. The State did not enforce its 
"right-side only" driving laws in these enclaves between 1 and 5 
a.m. Although fatalities increased, most agreed this approach 
was "progressive." 
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At the tum of the century, still other Iddians rejected their 
historic religion altogether. These "ultraliberals" followed 
Dariddian, who claimed that driving on the right side of the road 
was prevalent in Idd only because lddians were naturally right-
handed. Dariddian said immigrants, on the other hand, tended 
to drive on the left side of the road because they were left-
handed. Dariddian speculated that it might be natural for others 
to drive in the middle of the road or not to drive at all. Fossil 
evidence suggested the same. Thus, ultraliberals and liberals be-
gan arguing that ldd's traffic laws were themselves an impermis-
sible establishment of religion-a relic of what they termed 
"theocracy." 
Still, the "silent majority" in Idd, although less cohesive as 
each decade passed, persisted into the late-Twentieth Century, 
holding to a slightly liberalized version of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury liberal view. That is, the silent majority came to believe that 
driving on the right side of the road in the morning and after-
noon was proper, as was driving on the left side of the road in the 
evening. The atheists in the silent majority came to this view be-
cause they thought it was practical, whereas the liberal theists in 
the majority decided it was consistent with historic Iddian theol-
ogy. So-called "fundamentalists" continued to insist left side 
driving should only occur between 1 and 5 a.m. Once more, "ul-
trafundamentalists" called for a return to driving on only the 
right side always. They demanded conscientious exemptions 
from what they called the anti-family, liberalizing trend in the 
law, but ultraliberals argued that exemptions would be an estab-
lishment of religion. 
Nobody predicted what happened next. On June 4, 1998, 
the greatest mass tort in recorded history occurred when, sud-
denly, Iddians everywhere disobeyed ldd's traffic laws. Ideo-
logues claimed the long-awaited proletarian revolution had 
arrived. At least one-quarter of the population began driving on 
the right side of the road; another quarter drove on the left; an-
other, in the middle. The rest of the driving population stopped 
their vehicles in the road, unsure what to do. Collision after col-
lision followed, maiming and killing hundreds in what has be-
come known as the Lane Rebellion. 
Legal scholars who have evaluated the Lane Rebellion ar-
gue that the Supreme Court was to blame, either because it failed 
to protect basic, substantive rights of Idd's minorities or, depend-
ing on the scholar's views, overly protected them. I contend the 
legal scholars are wrong: that, at root, the Lane Rebellion was 
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the inevitable consequence of (1) the breakdown in Iddian con-
sensus regarding basic traffic values, and (2) the expansion of the 
Iddian state into nearly every area of life, snuffing out non-con-
formity. States' rights in ldd became largely theoretical. The 
Supreme Court of ldd fractured along the same lines as society 
when it tried to respond to the growing pluralism and centraliza-
tion of ldd: the "Right" deferred to facially neutral, generally ap-
plicable statutes, whereas the "Left" preferred balancing the 
interests of individuals against state or other interests on a case-
by-case basis. 
By deferring to generally applicable laws, the Right neces-
sarily identified with the majority rule, and, in effect, turned sub-
stantive constitutional rights into equality rights. The Right 
argued that granting exemptions to generally applicable rules 
would be a recipe for anarchy-opening a "flood gate" for fraud-
ulent claims. In contrast, the Left identified itself with the "en-
lightened" minority, so defined by liberal political theory. 
Rather than focus on tradition or the legitimacy of legislative 
outcomes, the Left emphasized the legitimacy of process for each 
Iddian, using terms like "fair play and substantive justice." The 
Left also tended to find Establishment Clause violations more 
frequently than the Right and to identify new rights for each Id-
dian by inference from the Constitution. The Left was also more 
willing to preempt the State's own solutions to these problems. 
One side won the judicial debate. We are not sure which, 
because the "Lane Rebellion" destroyed most of the evidence. 
However, assume for a moment that one group of legal scholars, 
the Plebians, are right. They say the Left won. The Plebians 
point out that, although prior to the Rebellion scholars on the 
Left contended their way would produce the fairest outcome for 
each individual, the Left never identified an instance where the 
State's interest was more important than the individual's right to 
an exemption, except where the individual applying for the ex-
emption was not a member of an "enlightened" group. Also, the 
Left discovered more and more constitutional rights it said were 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," so that Iddians al-
most could not advance in traffic without having to dodge one 
specially exempted vehicle or another. Slowly, but steadfastly, 
the rule of law in ldd reflected the values of the liberal and ul-
traliberal sects in ldd. 
Finally, according to the Plebians, the Supreme Court of Idd 
announced that the Framers of the Constitution really intended 
all Iddians to drive on the left side of the road. The Supreme 
104 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:101 
Court used structural arguments, like driving on the left side of 
the road is more consistent with Iddian democracy. The Court 
also said left -side driving promotes the dignity of discrete and 
insular minorities. In addition, the Supreme Court pointed out 
that left-side driving is more consistent with precedent identify-
ing personal autonomy and liberty as a fundamental, albeit im-
plicit constitutional right. Stare decisis, the Court emphasized, is 
a governing principle of the Court, all the more important when 
issues are controversial. 
Plebians say the Supreme Court eventually decided that 
driving on the right side of the road was a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause and inconsistent with the "ethos" of the Ibbian 
people. Fundamentalist Iddians objected and got the limited 
right to drive on the right side of the road on their church prop-
erty (which, by the way, the Court decided was taxable in every 
respect and subject to "anti-discrimination against ultraliberals" 
legislation). Ultrafundamentalist Iddian conduct was severely 
circumscribed, too. The state removed the driver's licenses of 
some ultrafundamentalists because they advocated an immediate 
lane change. In sum, according to the Plebians, it turned out that 
the Left's conception of "fair play and substantive justice" was 
no less biased or coercive than the Right's. 
However, Plubians contend the Plebians have it all wrong: 
that really the Right won the judicial debate. For the sake of 
argument, assume for a moment the Plubians are correct. They 
argue the primary reason for the Lane Rebellion was that the 
Supreme Court consistently refused to grant exemptions for mi-
norities burdened by the rule of law. Thus, the Court forced ul-
traliberals to, in effect, finance and abide by fundamentalist 
dogma. The Court said Idd's age-old traffic conventions had a 
secular purpose, secular effect, and did not lead to any religious 
entanglement with the state. One Iddian argued they "stole his 
spirit," but the Court treated this as simply an unfortunate, inci-
dental consequence of a generally applicable statute-in short, 
the Court held, "burn in hell." 
What's more, Plubians say that against one complaint the 
Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the right of ultraliberals 
to drive on the left side of the road between 2 and 3. a.m. when 
there would be no danger to others. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Sliasca said the exemption was not part of the common 
law tradition and would be too onerous to administrate. He ad-
ded the complainant made only a free exercise claim, whereas 
successful complainants made at least a free speech claim, as 
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well. Furthermore, Sliasca said exemption would not accord with 
representative democracy, since it required judges to use too 
much discretion. Concurring, Justice Rquisthen asked, "Who are 
we to decide in which lane lddians should drive?" The Court 
preferred to leave the decision to state legislators. 
Also, when Congress did have a change of heart and decided 
to allow left-side driving in ultraliberal enclaves during restricted 
hours, Plubians say the Supreme Court overturned the legisla-
tion. The Court said Congress' authority to pass the law was not 
explicit in the Commerce Clause, nor obvious from the intent of 
the Framers. Furthermore, Justice Rquisthen wrote that the ob-
vious intent of the regulation was other than to protect the health 
or welfare of Iddians. Ultimately, according to Plubians, the pen-
niless and powerless ultraliberals and many more moderate liber-
als were effectively disenfranchised from the political process and 
their lifestyles outlawed. 
Whether this sad tale of the Plubians is accurate, or that of 
the Plebians, does not matter to my argument. The important 
point is simply that one side of the judicial debate won. By win-
ning, that side alienated the clients of the other. Alienation was 
magnified by the fact that Idd had so centralized power that 
every political, economic, or social issue ultimately came to the 
Court for a winner-take-all decision. The Court imposed con-
formity, whereas Idd's states provided for diversity. Finally, the 
most idealistic lddians revolted and started the Lane Rebellion. 
Unbelievable? History has been too short to pronounce on 
the fate of a democracy lacking consensus on basic moral and 
legal values. The American Civil War shows one result; the 
"switch in time which saved nine," another. The lesson of the 
Lane Rebellion is that a democracy can persist only as long as it 
flexibly embraces the changing viewpoint and norms of not just a 
majority, but a super-majority. A bare majority leaves a substan-
tial minority in potential noncompliance and in need of exemp-
tion. Exemptions present a quantitative and qualitative problem 
which the Left underestimates. The quantitative problem is that 
as exemptions increase in number, either because the Left cre-
ates new constitutional rights or simply adds exemptions to ex-
isting laws, government cannot administer its program cost 
effectively and commerce becomes more difficult. Thus, driving 
in Idd may well have become more hazardous and a less efficient 
way of getting from point A to point B. On the other hand, the 
qualitative problem with exemptions is that, regardless of how 
many there are, even one radical departure from tradition may 
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inspire resistance by a majority or committed minority. In Idd, 
making left-side driving the constitutional norm would have so 
enraged fundamentalists, it is reasonable to assume this doctrinal 
shift would have led them to initiate the Lane Rebellion. 
This leads us to the realization the Right will not admit: that 
some exemptions for minorities are absolutely crucial to the rule 
of law in a democracy. The status quo is always gerrymandered 
in favor of some group, usually the dominant one of the past. On 
the other hand, the Left believes that where the Right failed to 
create "strict neutrality," it can succeed. This is also an illusion, 
since virtually no law is amoral, and no minority has been con-
tent with only equal protection. In Idd, ultraliberals at first de-
manded exemptions for left-side driving at particular hours, but 
then pushed to make driving on the left side of the road the 
norm. 
The Rule of Law must reflect some group's values. Imagine 
those values and their adherents arranged on an ideological con-
tinuum from left to right. The rule of law could be continuously 
amended to reflect the changing values of slightly more than the 
middle-half of the ideological spectrum. But as the extremes of 
the continuum diverged farther and farther from the median, the 
rule of law would become less coherent and the extremes more 
intent on overthrowing the legal system. With little more than 
pragmatism, precedent, the state's symbols, ceremonies, and sec-
ular religion to legitimate the rule of law, it would collapse like 
Idd's traffic regime and the wisp that was the Soviet Union. 
Today, Iddians who survived the Lane Rebellion flounder, 
are looking for some new rationale for driving on either the left 
or right side of the road. One side argues its way is more just; the 
other, the opposite. Pragmatists say Iddians should simply de-
cide, and let that be the end of it. But most Iddians believe there 
must be a "truth" about which side is the correct one to drive on, 
even if they do not agree what it is. The tragedy of the pluralist 
democracy is that only pragmatism or utilitarianism can be the 
basis of law once a dominant morality evaporates, and neither 
philosophy is compelling enough of a justification for most to de-
fend the rule of law against dogmatic idealists. Ultimately, the 
lesson of the Lane Rebellion is: without consensus about funda-
mental values, democracy collapses, regardless of what judicial 
and legislative countermeasures are taken. It happened in Idd, 
and it will happen in the United States. 
